Here are excerpts from "The End" in Portfolio by Michael Lewis, author of Liar's Poker, on the financial collapse. His article is based on the recollections of Wall Streeters who shorted subprime mortgages:
The juiciest shortsâ€”the bonds ultimately backed by the mortgages most likely to defaultâ€”had several characteristics. Theyâ€™d be in what Wall Street people were now calling the sand states: Arizona, California, Florida, Nevada.
Last I checked 50% of the number of defaults were in the four sand states. I haven't seen any estimates of dollars defaulted in those four states, but I imagine it was 70% or higher.
Still, I'm not sure that "sand" is the truly relevant common characteristic of the sand states.
The loans would have been made by one of the more dubious mortgage lenders; Long Beach Financial, wholly owned by Washington Mutual, was a great example. Long Beach Financial was moving money out the door as fast as it could, few questions asked, in loans built to self-destruct. It specialized in asking homeÂowners with bad credit and no proof of income to put no money down and defer interest payments for as long as possible. In Bakersfield, California, a Mexican strawberry picker with an income of $14,000 and no English was lent every penny he needed to buy a house for $720,000.
More generally, the subprime market tapped a tranche of the American public that did not typically have anything to do with Wall Street. Lenders were making loans to people who, based on their credit ratings, were less creditworthy than 71 percent of the population. Eisman knew some of these people. One day, his housekeeper, a South American woman, told him that she was planning to buy a townhouse in Queens. â€?The price was absurd, and they were giving her a low-down-payment option-ARM,â€? says Eisman, who talked her into taking out a conventional fixed-rate mortgage. Next, the baby nurse heâ€™d hired back in 1997 to take care of his newborn twin daughters phoned him. â€?She was this lovely woman from Jamaica,â€? he says. â€?One day she calls me and says she and her sister own five townhouses in Queens. I said, â€?How did that happen?â€™â€‰â€? It happened because after they bought the first one and its value rose, the lenders came and suggested they refinance and take out $250,000, which they used to buy another one. Then the price of that one rose too, and they repeated the experiment. â€?By the time they were done,â€? Eisman says, â€?they owned five of them, the market was falling, and they couldnâ€™t make any of the payments.â€?
This small hedge fund started shorting big investment banks, then found out they could short the securitized bonds directly.
But the scarcity of truly crappy subprime-mortgage bonds no longer mattered. The big Wall Street firms had just made it possible to short even the tiniest and most obscure subprime-mortgage-backed bond by creating, in effect, a market of side bets. Instead of shorting the actual BBB bond, you could now enter into an agreement for a credit-default swap with Deutsche Bank or Goldman Sachs. It cost money to make this side bet, but nothing like what it cost to short the stocks, and the upside was far greater.
The arrangement bore the same relation to actual finance as fantasy football bears to the N.F.L. Eisman was perplexed in particular about why Wall Street firms would be coming to him and asking him to sell short. â€?What Lippman did, to his credit, was he came around several times to me and said, â€?Short this market,â€™â€‰â€? Eisman says. â€?In my entire life, I never saw a sell-side guy come in and say, â€?Short my market.â€™â€‰â€?
And short Eisman didâ€”then he tried to get his mind around what heâ€™d just done so he could do it better. Heâ€™d call over to a big firm and ask for a list of mortgage bonds from all over the country. ...
In retrospect, pretty much all of the riskiest subprime-backed bonds were worth betting against; they would all one day be worth zero. But at the time Eisman began to do it, in the fall of 2006, that wasnâ€™t clear. He and his team set out to find the smelliest pile of loans they could so that they could make side bets against them with Goldman Sachs or Deutsche Bank. What they were doing, oddly enough, was the analysis of subprime lending that should have been done before the loans were made: Which poor Americans were likely to jump which way with their finances? How much did home prices need to fall for these loans to blow up? (It turned out they didnâ€™t have to fall; they merely needed to stay flat.) The default rate in Georgia was five times higher than that in Florida even though the two states had the same unemployment rate. Why? Indiana had a 25 percent default rate; Californiaâ€™s was only 5 percent. Why?
Why? Because the bubble was worse in Florida and California than in Georgia and Indiana. In the sand states in the fall of 2006, there were still Greater Fools around who believed that Hispanicization meant an unending increase in home values. The idea never gets fully articulated — are home prices high because Hispanics can pay high prices? Or are home prices high because non-Hispanics are desperately paying high home prices to get their kids away from public schools full of Hispanics? When you spell out the logical alternatives, neither one sounds terribly sustainable, but the point is that political correctness keeps people from thinking it through. Young Wall Streeters just all emotionally believed Diversity = Goodness = Money.
It's one of those ideas — that a constant influx of Hispanics meant ever growing property values — that people get in their heads vaguely, but aren't allowed to interrogate under our reigning worldview and our reigning EEOC regulations, under which Malcolm Gladwell makes a fortune and Charles Murray makes nothing lecturing corporations.
Moses actually flew down to Miami and wandered around neighborhoods built with subprime loans to see how bad things were. â€?Heâ€™d call me and say, â€?Oh my God, this is a calamity here,â€™â€‰â€? recalls Eisman. All that was required for the BBB bonds to go to zero was for the default rate on the underlying loans to reach 14 percent. Eisman thought that, in certain sections of the country, it would go far, far higher.
The funny thing, looking back on it, is how long it took for even someone who predicted the disaster to grasp its root causes. They were learning about this on the fly, shorting the bonds and then trying to figure out what they had done. Eisman knew subprime lenders could be scumbags. What he underestimated was the total unabashed complicity of the upper class of American capitalism. For instance, he knew that the big Wall Street investment banks took huge piles of loans that in and of themselves might be rated BBB, threw them into a trust, carved the trust into tranches, and wound up with 60 percent of the new total being rated AAA.
But he couldnâ€™t figure out exactly how the rating agencies justified turning BBB loans into AAA-rated bonds. â€?I didnâ€™t understand how they were turning all this garbage into gold,â€? he says. He brought some of the bond people from Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, and UBS over for a visit. â€?We always asked the same question,â€? says Eisman. â€?Where are the rating agencies in all of this? And Iâ€™d always get the same reaction. It was a smirk.â€? He called Standard & Poorâ€™s and asked what would happen to default rates if real estate prices fell. The man at S&P couldnâ€™t say; its model for home prices had no ability to accept a negative number. â€?They were just assuming home prices would keep going up,â€? Eisman says. ...Thatâ€™s when Eisman finally got it. Here heâ€™d been making these side bets with Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank on the fate of the BBB tranche without fully understanding why those firms were so eager to make the bets. Now he saw. There werenâ€™t enough Americans with shitty credit taking out loans to satisfy investorsâ€™ appetite for the end product. The firms used Eismanâ€™s bet to synthesize more of them. Here, then, was the difference between fantasy finance and fantasy football: When a fantasy player drafts Peyton Manning, he doesnâ€™t create a second Peyton Manning to inflate the leagueâ€™s stats. But when Eisman bought a credit-default swap, he enabled Deutsche Bank to create another bond identical in every respect but one to the original. The only difference was that there was no actual homebuyer or borrower. The only assets backing the bonds were the side bets Eisman and others made with firms like Goldman Sachs. Eisman, in effect, was paying to Goldman the interest on a subprime mortgage. In fact, there was no mortgage at all. â€?They werenâ€™t satisfied getting lots of unqualified borrowers to borrow money to buy a house they couldnâ€™t afford,â€? Eisman says. â€?They were creating them out of whole cloth. One hundred times over! Thatâ€™s why the losses are so much greater than the loans. But thatâ€™s when I realized they needed us to keep the machine running. I was like, This is allowed?â€?
Still, this leaves open the question of why the financial engineers chose strawberry pickers with $720,000 mortgages to replicate in order to place double or nothing bets. Why not replicate your bets on Steve Jobs? Why build mountains of leverage on top of the pebble of probability that the strawberry picker was going to pay back his mortgage or find an even greater fool wanting to pay a fortune to live among strawberry pickers?