From The Atlantic, a sensible article suggesting that the single biggest unforced error in making the Syrian civil war a vast nightmare was Turkish supremo Erdogan’s gratuitous decision to turn against his buddy Assad in the hope of becoming the moral leader of the Islamic world.
Turkey Made a Bet Against Assad—And Lost
Back in 2011, Erdoğan supported the rebels against the Syrian regime in hopes of gaining influence across the Middle East. Things haven’t gone according to plan.
JOOST HILTERMANN
10:03 AM ETBefore the war in Syria broke out in 2011, a budding personal friendship between Bashar al-Assad, the leader of Syria, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the president of Turkey, augured close economic ties and an open border. That would be only the beginning: Turkey saw Syria as the launching pad for its plans to become the dominant economic force in the Arab world, a region it had largely retreated from after losing its vast Arab provinces with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. …
The ascendancy of Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), with its conservative base of small-business owners and Muslim Brotherhood–inspired ideology, heralded a decade of rapid economic growth starting in 2002. A confident Turkey embarked on a policy of “zero problems” in its neighborhood, presenting itself as the region’s düzen kurucu, or “order setter.” The government expected significant economic payoffs, as Turkish companies fanned out across the region and made their mark, especially in the construction sector. Turkish television channels entertained Arab audiences with Turkish soaps, warming them up for visa-free visits to Istanbul and the Mediterranean coast.
When I was in Turkey in 2009, the big controversy in the English language Istanbul newspaper was that the Turkish government wanted to dig up the minefield laid along the Syrian border in the 1950s and had hired an Israeli firm to do it. That seemed like the kind of encouraging problem a peaceful and prosperous country would have.
But the Syrian uprising forced Turkey to reconsider. Erdoğan severed his ties with Assad and cast his lot with the popular, predominantly Sunni opposition, making the bet that they would overthrow the minority Alawite-based regime. …
In response, Turkey began to focus on its most immediate concern: Syria’s civil war, which the Erdoğan government, along with its Western and Gulf allies, helped kindle in a failing effort to defeat the Assad regime. Instead, the war not only undermined Turkey’s interests as its rebel allies lost their footing—it opened a vacuum that jihadists and the PKK, Turkey’s two most formidable enemies, were keen to exploit.
Erdogan was a decent leader of Turkey for about 8 years, but then his success swelled his head and made him go looking for trouble out of ambition. A lot of bad things that happen in this world have a certain tragic inevitability, but Erdogan deciding to get heavily involved in trying to overthrow the Damascus regime wasn’t one of them.
