Republished on VDARE.COM on March 28, 2003
The Poignant Patrician
(Biography of Harold Macmillan)
By Peter Brimelow
Wall Street Journal Bookshelf, New York March
16, 1989
We live and learn. Anyone who remembers the hyping of
President Kennedy and his attractive family must have
wondered, on subsequently discovering the peculiar
reality, whatever happened to Camelot's investigative
reporters. Similarly, anyone remembering Kennedy's
political contemporary Harold Macmillan only as
Britain's imperturbable and patrician prime minister
(1956-63) will be astounded to find that this first
volume of his authorized biography "Harold Macmillan:
1894-1956" (Viking, 537 pages, $24.95) contains
long-suppressed details of an equally remarkable love
life—albeit one infinitely more poignant and romantic.
Macmillan had all the elite hallmarks—Eton, Oxford
and the Brigade of Guards. His mother was American, from
Spencer, Ind., but this was hardly a problem: so was
Winston Churchill's mother, after all. However,
Macmillan's family was "in trade" (his grandfather, born
on a Scottish croft, founded the publishing house that
still bears his name). In Britain's subtle class system,
he was socially much inferior to his wife, a daughter of
the Duke of Devonshire. In 1930, after bearing him three
children, Lady Dorothy Macmillan became involved with
another rising Tory politician, Robert Boothby. She ran
both men in tandem until her death in 1966, apparently
ceasing all conjugal relations with Macmillan although
outwardly remaining the perfect political wife.
Macmillan's complaisancy could be attributed to
cynicism in an era when connections were crucial and
divorce was damaging, if not fatal, to a political
career. But Alistair Horne argues that in fact he was
devastated. He suffered a nervous breakdown and may even
have attempted suicide. However, divorce was hard for a
devout high-church Episcopalian who in his youth had
seriously considered converting to Catholicism. And
Macmillan truly loved his wife: He never was involved
with another woman. The cost was frightful—not least to
the children, all of whom became alcoholics and the
fourth of whom, generally agreed to be Boothby's,
committed suicide after being forced by Lady Dorothy to
have an abortion that left her sterile. But the marriage
survived. And in Macmillan's old age—he died in 1986 at
the age of 92—he observed that "in doing what was
difficult, I had my reward at the end."
Mr. Horne tells this novelist's story with his usual
smooth competence. But as a distinguished military
historian, author of studies of the Franco-Algerian and
Franco-German conflicts, he really is more interested in
the intricacies of Macmillan's wartime diplomacy as
British minister resident in North Africa and Italy; and
in the climactic Anglo-French Suez expedition in 1956,
which made Macmillan prime minister by destroying the
health and credibility of his rival, Sir Anthony Eden.
The result is a solid piece of furniture. But a
non-British audience surely would have been better
served by Macmillan's life in one volume. And, more
seriously, Mr. Horne ultimately is too orthodox to
develop fully Macmillan's role in the implosion of
Britain—one of the most dramatic geopolitical collapses
in history, full of significance for an America
fashionably worried about imperial overstretch.
Even before the Depression, Macmillan had emerged as
a British version of a very liberal Republican, annoying
Tory leaders with his continuous calls for massive
government intervention in the economy. Mr. Horne, no
economist, seems to regard this as prescient for no
better reason than that the intervention subsequently
occurred, never considering Mrs. Thatcher's ultimate
diagnosis that it actually exacerbated Britain's
economic decline. Similarly, Mr. Horne accepts the
conventional view that Macmillan was right in his
vehement opposition to Appeasement, although a case can
be made that World War II, while beneficial for
Macmillan's political position, fatally injured
Britain's. Mr. Horne's discussion of the developing Suez
crisis never reflects the fact that it became possible
only because of the decision, bitterly denounced by the
much-derided Tory right-wingers, to abandon Britain's
military base there in 1954. (Oddly, Mr. Horne
consistently neglects grand strategy for tactical
detail.) And he takes for granted the wisdom of
Macmillan's longstanding enthusiasm for merging Britain
into a supranational "European" state—not just a free
trade area but a political union.
This lack of larger perspective shadows one of Mr.
Horne's central contentions: that there was nothing
untoward in Macmillan's role in 1945 when the Allies
shipped thousands of Soviet and Yugoslav refugees back
to the Communists, who promptly murdered them. Mr. Horne
thinks this was a blunder but not a conspiracy, as some
have hinted. It could be noted, however, that Macmillan
never used this experience to help disabuse the West's
elites of their astonishing illusions about Stalin. As
throughout Macmillan's career, a nastier interpretation
of his ambition and political sensitivities remains
possible.
Still, whatever else can be said about Macmillan and
the British ruling class, they never flinched from
leading the nation in war. In 1914, Macmillan used his
family influence to get into action; he was wounded four
times. More than 40 years later, when Eden told him the
news of his impending resignation, it was to their
common experiences on the Western Front that the two old
men's thoughts immediately turned. It is a comment on
the American elite that no similar conversation will
take place in the White House on the 40th anniversary of
the Tet Offensive.
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Mr. Brimelow is a senior editor of Forbes Magazine.