Republished on VDARE.com on February 28, 2004
Ralph Nader, Inc.
By Peter Brimelow
and Leslie Spencer
[First published in Forbes,
Sept 17, 1990 v146 n6 p117(9)]
Peter Brimelow Comments In 2004.
CONSUMER crusader Ralph Nader
recently visited Moscow, along with the cameras of CBS'
60 Minutes, for a show to be aired this fall. According
to an account in New York's Village Voice, Nader
was "shocked" when a Soviet official praised free-market
economist
Milton Friedman. He "protested" that plans to
privatize Soviet television might give opportunities to
Western corporations. And, taken aback by the complaints
of Russian consumers standing in line for hours, he
suggested:
“Some
people say that because the Soviet people have to stand
in line, it gives them time to reflect and become
philosophical."
The entire crowd laughed at him.
Americans, however, are not
laughing at Nader—yet. Indeed, when insurance executives
were planning their
futile $30 million effort to defeat California's
Proposition 103, the auto premium roll-back and
regulation initiative that threw the industry into chaos
in 1988, they shrank from attacking Nader directly
although he was campaigning as the measure's most
visible advocate. Their cowardly rationale: Polls showed
he was simply too popular.
Nader's popularity is based on an
almost unchallenged perception: that he is "Saint
Ralph," as New Republic magazine once put it.
"In all statistical probability, at least several
dozen of you who are reading this issue of the New
Republic would be dead today if Nader hadn't
single-handedly invented the issue of auto safety, "
wrote editor Michael Kinsley, now co-host Of CNN'S
Crossfire and one of many ex-Nader employees
strategically placed in the elite media: "Ralph is
living proof that there isn't much difference between a
fanatic and a saint."
But saints attract myths as well as
miracles. Nader did not single-handedly invent the auto
safety issue. For example, Senator Abraham Ribicoff (D-Conn.)
had long been interested in the cause. He was actually
dramatizing his own proposed legislation on the famous
occasion in 1966 when he dragged groveling General
Motors executives before his subcommittee to confess
that they had indeed set detectives onto Nader, whose
Unsafe At Any Speed attacked-their
Corvair.
Nor do statistics necessarily
suggest that a Nader miracle has protected the New
Republic subscription list. The fact is that U.S.
traffic fatalities per 100 million miles traveled had
fallen rapidly throughout the century, from 24 in 1921
to 5.3 in 1965. They have continued to fall since, to a
recent 2.2. In 1965 the U.S. traffic fatality rate was
about the lowest in the world-and it still is. Arguably,
sheer economic growth and technological improvement have
been the decisive factors here: Americans just
consistently bought better, safer cars as they became
available and affordable.
But there is an even more pervasive
myth about Nader. As ex-Nader aide Gary Sellers once put
it:: "Because Ralph is self-sustaining, he is
responsible only to his own conscience. The others
aren't—they're in the middle of a web of interests, and
they have to compromise their ideals to protect present
income or future sources."
Last year FORBES found evidence
that Nader had not in fact miraculously levitated above
the "web of interests" in which other human
beings are caught, but instead was intimately entwined
with a group of rich lawyers:
the plaintiff bar.
Our 1989 survey of the best-paid
lawyers in America revealed that the top legal looters
are not Ivy League corporate paper-pushers in Wall
Street firms, but obscure plaintiff attorneys around the
country-specialists in suing, often in
personal injury cases. They are getting rich from
the interaction of
contingent fees, which get them 30% to 40% of any
damage award in addition to expenses, and the litigation
explosion resulting from the rewriting of "tort" law,
covering personal injury and accidents, by a generation
of reformist judges (FORBES, Oct. 16, 1989).
By rich, we mean very rich. Total
contingent fee payments, excluding expenses, are now
estimated to exceed $10 billion a year and to be rising.
FORBES identified at least 62 plaintiff attorneys who
made more than $2 million in each of the previous two
years. Top moneymaker in 1988: Houston's
Joe Jamail, with $450 million to $600 million.
Perhaps out of an uneasy
conscience, the plaintiff attorneys were eager to tell
us about their financial support of the noble Nader.
"We are what supports Nader, "
said Pensacola's
Frederic Levin ($7.5 million, 1988 income). "We
contribute to him, and he fundraises through us." "We
support him overtly, covertly, in every way possible,"
said San Antonio's Pat Maloney ($6 million). "I
should think we give him a huge percentage of what he
raises."
Why? Says Austin's Bob Gibbins
($3.7 million): "Nader supports all of our issues,
and we support all of his."
The most visible aspect of this
mutual support is the devastating bombardment of
unfavorable publicity that Nader and his affiliates,
through their unrivaled media contacts, are able to
bring down on corporations which are simultaneously
defending a product liability issue. Nader organizations
have collaborated in such recent firestorms as the Audi
5000's alleged "sudden acceleration," which
government investigators subsequently showed to be
totally false.
Regardless of the merits, bad
publicity can cripple a defendant's business and compel
him to consider settling out of court in the hope of a
quiet life-generally the most profitable outcome for the
plaintiff attorneys. And for Nader, successful lawsuits
are just another way of imposing his policy
prescriptions, despite the plaintiff attorneys'
expensive rakeoff.
When
American Tort Reform Association former president
James Coyne asked Nader about his plaintiff attorney
funding at a press conference in Washington, he stormed
from the podium and his supporter, Jay Angoff, rushed
over and punched Coyne in the eye. (Angoff says it was a
“very very mild shove.") Nader has refused to
talk to FORBES, but in a press-time fax he insisted:
"Over the past 30 years, not I % of the total funds
raised by all our organizations have come from the legal
profession."
Nader's hypersensitivity is easily
explained. No one in American public life has been freer
with accusations that his opponents are compromised by
their own financial sources.
On May 10 there were bitter
exchanges during Senate Consumer Subcommittee hearings
on the Product Liability Reform Act, an attempt to
stabilize the tort crisis. Two co-sponsors, Senators Jay
Rockefeller (D-W.Va.) and John Danforth (R-Mo.),
objected to a letter Nader had published in their home
newspapers, attacking their interest in tort reform and
accusing them of being "huddled in Washington with
corporate lobbyists, many of whom finance your [the
Senators'] campaigns . . . taking away the existing
rights of injured or sick people against the
perpetrators of their harm."
Public Citizen's Sidney Wolfe, appearing as a
witness, interjected angrily that Danforth was
"lying" for suggesting that the organization was "talking
for the economic trial lawyers." Wolfe claimed that
Nader "has had no connection with Public Citizen since
1980”—although Nader's
identification with his flagship is so complete that
his name is emblazoned on its recent direct mail
campaign envelopes. Confronted with FORBES' Oct. 16
article, Wolfe asserted it contained "several
mistakes" and implied that Nader's response had
forced a FORBES "retraction or correction."
(Quite untrue.)
Wolfe grudgingly said he would
provide details of Public Citizen's own financing by
trial lawyers "if it is possible." Somehow, it
wasn't.
Nader tactics in the face of this
sort of inquiry apparently haven't changed in nearly 20
years. In 1972 New Republic linked the fact that
Nader's
Center for Auto Safety had accepted a $10,000 check
from the Association of Trial Lawyers of America to his
opposition to no-fault insurance. Wall Street Journal
editor David Sanford, in his book
“Me & Ralph: Is Nader Unsafe for America"
recounts Nader's reaction: (1) refusal to discuss the
subject; (2) a "hysterical, personally abusive"
counterattack; (3) a claim that the Center for Auto
Safety was independent of him, although Sanford later
confirmed that Nader was intimately involved in the
organization; (4) a claim that a New Republic
note that its story did not say Nader's position was
actually "determined" by ATLA'S check was a
"retraction."
Encouraged by all this, FORBES has
performed a Nader-type raid on Nader. But let's be
clear: We're not saying that Nader's views are
"determined" by his financing. We're being more
charitable about him than he is about his own opponents.
Nader's views could well just coincide with his
backers'. But his contacts could also have consequences.
For example, in 1988 Nader and
California plaintiff attorneys agreed to exchange his
credibility for their money. Nader came out in
opposition to Proposition 106, a popular contingent-fee
limitation measure.
"[106] was certain to pass,"
says Claremont, Calif.'s Herb Hafif (1988 income, $40
million). "It had 70% -to-approval 80% ratings among
the public, and no one [in the plaintiff bar] thought it
could be taken on directly. ... Finally I asked Ralph to
help, and he did ... and I helped his 103 initiative,
and it passed by a few points, and we beat 106 by a few
points."
This was not a sellout but a true
compromise. It's embarrassing for Nader to be attacked
for his studied passivity on contingent fees and the
many other anticonsumer practices of the plaintiff bar.
And the plaintiff attorneys presumably don't really want
to destroy the insurance companies, the "deep pockets"
that pay their fees and pass the costs on to consumers.
But both sides sank their differences to make an
effective alliance.
It just wasn't especially saintly.
We're also not investigating
Nader's personal finances. But he has made his austerity
vow central to his public image. He told the
Washington Post last summer that he lives on less
than $10,500 a year. (In a fax reply to our questions,
he amended it: "Closer to $15,000, now. Insurance
premiums sharply up.") We take this with a pinch of
low-sodium seasoning.
"Oh God, limousines and nothing
but the best hotels," says a disillusioned former
state Trial Lawyers Association official. "We got
quite a bill when he was in town." Nader's agent
says he makes 50 to 100 appearances a year, charging a
sliding scale; FORBES has heard of five-figure fees,
suggesting an upper limit of $1 million speaking income
alone.
Nader has confirmed to FORBES that
his total earnings were around $250,000 a year back in
the early 1970s—"funds devoted to our causes."
But this is another Nader miracle/myth that needs to be
set in perspective. Nader's "causes" are usually
tax-exempt entities. Giving money to them is not the
same as giving a quarter to a street person. It can
generate tax deductions—as well as, in effect, financing
Nader's own business. Indeed, Nader may personally own
the Public Safety Research Institute (net worth,
$649,000), because he has registered it under Delaware's
peculiar nonprofit law—an irony, because he has
denounced business' taking advantage of the state's
liberal incorporation rules.
Another Nader miracle/myth: his
long-standing claim that he lives "in a simple room"
near his office. Even Nader's close associates
apparently aren't told the address. And he personally
repeated the story to the New York Times' Philip
Shenon last year.
But neighbors say, and have said
for nearly 20 years, that Nader lives in a townhouse,
worth perhaps.$1.5 million and assessed at $7,400 annual
property taxes, on Bancroft Place in northwest
Washington, D. C. (see picture, p. 117). District
records show the deed is held by Nader's sister Claire,
who seems to work in his organization. (Nader still
denies this, and will say only that his sister "works
on a number of civic projects and research programs. ")
There's nothing shocking about
living well, except by Nader's peculiar standards. His
many admirers would certainly be happy to buy him an
ecclesiastical palace. But maybe that would suggest he
was not a saint but human—even, possibly,
fallible.
FORBES estimates Nader has control
to varying degrees over 29 organizations with combined
revenues of $75 million to $80 million and assets of at
least $23 million (see chart, p. 120).
We faced three problems:
And although Nader has campaigned
for federal chartering of corporations on the grounds
that they tend to be controlled by "a management
autocracy," this exactly describes his own
organizations. Nader's control over his nucleus appears
absolute. And even some Nader affiliates that accept a
"membership," like Public Citizen, have no provisions
for internal democracy. By contrast, full members of the
National Rifle Association get to vote on board
members and other aspects of its governance.
But then, they don't have the
advantage of being saints.
All of which eerily resembles
nothing so much as John D. Rockefeller's original secret
Standard Oil Trust. This
"shrewd and slippery device for evading responsibility,"
in the words of the great muckraking journalist
Ida Tarbell, "had no legal existence. It was a
force as powerful as gravitation and as intangible. You
could argue its existence from its effects, but you
could never prove it. You could no more grasp it than
you could an eel."
Questions to the Standard Oil Trust
had to be phrased with extreme care because of a bland
pretense that there was no one here but us chickens
working "in harmony," and because of an unsaintly
penchant for legalistic loopholes. The Nader Trust is
just the same but considerably ruder.
Presumably one reason for this
behavior: deniability. Thus key Nader henchperson Joan
Claybrook, Public Citizen's president, said last year
that “we have 50,000 members [contributors of $50 or
more]. I would be surprised if there were 20 members of
the plaintiff bar among them."
Claybrook could have told us that,
apart from Public Citizen, three Nader affiliates were
openly funded by plaintiff attorneys to the tune of
almost $1 million. And that she was on the board of one
of them.
Another possible reason for the
Nader Trust's secrecy: It's partly built with
tax-deductible money. Up to 40% of all its funds are
what Washington calls "tax expenditures"—money
that would otherwise be in government hands. And just as
the legal environment of the time made it difficult for
Rockefeller to organize across state lines, the
complications of tax law today may well make it hard for
Nader to simultaneously generate propaganda, lobby and
campaign for his political candidates while preserving
deductible status. For both Rockefeller and Nader,
noninvolvement may be a necessary legal fiction.
Already the Federal Election
Commission has fined one Nader loose affiliate, the
Illinois Public Action Council, for illegal use of funds
in a political campaign. The FEC is currently
considering a complaint by the National Republican
Senatorial Committee alleging massive use of tax-exempt
money in the 1988 election by Citizen Action and its
affiliates in alliance with the UAW, the
National Education Association, the Machinists and
other labor unions.
Who supports the Nader Trust?
Despite its best efforts, the web of interests' outline
is clear (see chart, above).
Some threads of this web merit
particular attention: